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Badges of Modern Slavery 
Amir Paz-Fuchs 
It is hard for us to appreciate that in spite of great efforts made by the 
emancipators and their successors, in spite of the revolution in public opinion as 
regards all forms of slavery, in spite of the plethora of international agreements 
for the suppression of slavery (some 300 of them), the problem of slavery in the 
twentieth century is as great, indeed greater than it was in the 1830s.1 
 
Abstract 
Notwithstanding the 19th century formal abolition of slavery as legal ownership of people, modern slavery 
and forced labour have not been consigned to the past. In fact, their existence is more widespread, and 
made more difficult to tackle due to the lack of formal, legal criteria. This article suggests that reference to 
the past, historical institutions reveals seven ‘badges of slavery’ that are helpful in identifying occurrences 
of modern slavery and forced labour. These are: humiliation, ownership of people, exploitation of the 
vulnerable, lack of consent, terms and conditions of employment, limits on the power to end the 
employment relationship, and denial of rights outside the work relationship. These aspects constitute 
modern slavery as such, and thus distinguishes it from other instances of exploitative employment 
relations, however problematic. In addition, even where the label of modern slavery is misplaced, the 
identification of particular badges of slavery in contemporary employment relations may assist in 
highlighting their troubling facets. 
 
Keywords: Slavery, forced labour, employment, exploitation, migrant workers, free choice. 
 
1. Introduction: Badges of Slavery and the Long Shadow of the Institution 
In Mohsin Hamid’s novel, the Reluctant Fundamentalist, the narrator muses: ‘once 
admitted I hired a charioteer who belonged to a serf class lacking the requisite permissions 
to abide legally and forced therefore to accept work at lower pay; I myself was a form of 
indentured servant whose right to remain was dependent upon the continued benevolence 
of my employer’.2 This ‘indentured servant’, it should be immediately noted, was not a 
member of an excluded caste working in a sweat shop in a developing country, but rather 
a Princeton graduate working in New York city for a major investment firm. So could he 
seriously be considered an ‘indentured servant’? 
                                                           Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Sussex; Research Associate Fellow, Centre for Socio-Legal 
Studies, University of Sussex. Jo Bridgeman, Tom Frost, Judy Fudge, Virginia Mantouvalou and Linsday Stirton 
have offered very helpful comments to this paper, for which I am thoroughly grateful.  
1 Lord Wilberforce, ‘Introduction’ in R. Sawyer, Slavery in the Twentieth Century (London: Routledge, 1986), 
vii. 
2 M. Hamid, The Reluctant Fundamentalist 178 (London: Penguin, 2008)  
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The reason this question is not complete hyperbole is because, while trade in slaves was 
made illegal in the UK in 1807, and across the British Empire in 1834,3 it is only one 
particular instance of slavery, namely the legal, formal ownership of people, which has been 
eradicated. In fact, it is abundantly clear that ‘slavery is not a horror safely consigned to the 
past’.4 A few indicators to that effect may be mentioned. In 2004, the European 
Parliamentary Assembly stated that it ‘is dismayed that slavery continues to exist in Europe 
in the twenty-first century. Although, officially, slavery was abolished over 150 years ago, 
thousands of people are still held as slaves in Europe, treated as objects, humiliated and 
abused’.5 In Britain, the Modern Slavery Act6 (MSA) received Royal Assent on 26th March, 
2015, and the first prosecution under the MSA was launched in August 2015.7 In 2016, the 
Associated Press won the Pulitzer Prize for its year-long investigative report on slavery in 
the seafood industry in Asia.8 Slaves were forced to work 20-22 hours a day, were locked 
up, drank filthy water and ate few spoons of rice, and were not permitted to contact their 
families. The report led to the rescue of over 2000 slaves.9 
So how we are to reconcile the existence of slavery with its formal abolition? It has 
become clear that the very abolition of formal, legal slavery, exemplified in the ownership of 
an individual by another, has obscured the situation significantly, particularly in the 
employment context.10 In fact, the term modern slavery has been attached to discussions 
ranging ‘from prostitution to child labour to illegal immigration to female circumcision to 
                                                          
3 British Emancipation Act 1834. 
4 K. Bales, Disposable People (Revised Edition, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004) 3. 
5 Parliamentary Assembly Report (Recommendation 1663, Doc. 10144) Domestic Slavery: Servitude, Au-Pairs 
and Mail-Order Brides (2004), para 1.  
6  Modern Slavery Act 2015 c 30. 
7  F. Lawrence, ‘Lithuanian migrants trafficked to UK egg farms sue “worst gangmaster ever”’ The Guardian (10 
August 2015).  
8 R. McDowell, M. Manson and M. Medoza, “Slaves may have caught the fish you bought” The Associated Press 
(25 March 2015) 
http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/ap-investigation-slaves-may-have-caught-the-fish-you-
bought.html  
9 E. Htusan and M. Mason, ‘More than 2,000 enslaved fisherman rescued in 6 months’ Associated Press (17 
September 2015).  
http://www.ap.org/explore/seafood-from-slaves/more-than-2,000-enslaved-fishermen-rescued-in-6-months.html  
10 In Britain, the denial of the existence of chattel slavery is associated with Lord Mansfield’s speech in Somerset 
v Stewart (1772) Lofft 1, 98 ER 499. And yet, Lord Manfield’s decision in The Zong – Gregrson v Gilbert (1783) 
3 Dougl 232, 99 ER 629 points to the limits of the Somerset ruling.  As TT Arvind explains, “the entire transatlantic 
slave trade was based around treating slaves as if they were chattel”, and Lord Mansfield was not willing to rule 
in a manner that would have severe implications for the British economy – ‘“Though it Shocks One Very Much”: 
Formalism and Pragmatism in the Zong and Bancoult’ (2011) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1, 29. 
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begging to organ trading’.11 But it holds an even more uncomfortable place for those 
concerned with employment rights and employment relations. The lack of a clear definition 
as to what forms of exploitative labour relations may be regarded as slavery has allowed 
critics of agency work,12 workfare schemes,13 privatisation,14 the regulation of migrant 
workers15 and even the treatment of professional athletes,16 to align these practices with 
forced labour, or even slavery. In some cases, these comparisons are no more than 
rhetorical tools, designed to attract attention to a particular claim.17 In other cases, however, 
the comparison between the historical institution of slavery and contemporary 
employment practices may be instructive.  
The growing appreciation for the need to find a more open-ended term that 
addresses the problems with voluntariness in contemporary labour markets, without the 
need to refer to every such instance as slavery, servitude or forced labour, has led to the 
term ‘unfree labour’ to appear more prominently in the literature in recent years.18 Unlike 
forced labour or slavery, ‘“unfree labour” is not a legal concept, nor should it aspire to 
be’.19 To an extent, it offers an additional, less intimidating, and yet still conceptually 
problematic, way of criticising the regulation of migrant work20 and temporary work 
                                                          
11 J. O’Connell Davidson, Modern Slavery – The Margins of Freedom 3 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015) 
12 J. Denys, ‘Challenges for Temporary Agency Work in the Information Society’, in R. Blanpain and R. Graham 
(eds), Temporary Agency Work and the Information Society (London: Kluwer Law, 2004) 9, 11, noting that ‘Some 
still consider the industry as a modern form of slave labour’. 
13
 B. Anderson, Us and Them? The Dangerous Politics of Immigration Control (Oxford: OUP, 2013) 150; The 
argument that workfare is forced labour was raised before the British Supreme Court, the European Court of 
Human Rights, and American Courts – respectively: R (Reilly and Wilson) v Secretary of State for Work and 
Pensions [2013] UKSC 68; Talmon v the Netherlands (1997) EHRLR 448 and Schuitemaker v the Netherlands 
(2010) ECHR 820; Brogan v San Mateo County, 901 F.2d 762 (9th Cir. 1990). See also: S. Duffy, ‘Workfare is 
Modernised Slavery’, Huffington Post (27 February 2013) 
http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/dr-simon-duffy/workfare-is-modernised-slavery_b_2773051.html (all URLs 
were last accessed on 15 May 2016). 
14 In the Israeli case of The New Histadtrut Workers’ Union v The Israeli Aerospace Industry, minority judge 
Elisheva Barak of the National Labour Court argued that transferring workers from the public to the private sector 
against their will is modern slavery. 
15 V. Mantouvalou, ‘“Am I Free Now?’ Overseas Domestic Workers in Slavery’ (2015) 42 Journal of Law and 
Society 329; When the Israeli Supreme Court struck down a policy binding migrant workers to a particular 
employer, Justice Cheshin referred to the practice as ‘modern slavery’ – HCJ 4542/02 Workers Hotline v the 
Government of Israel (2006). 
16 I. Herbert, ‘Ronaldo: I am a slave’ The Independent (11 July 2008); S. Leahy, ‘Adrian Peterson: Players’ Place 
in NFL ‘like modern day slavery”’ USA Today (15 March 2011).  
17 On the problem of using the same concept for historical and contemporary practices see Rebecca Scott, “Under 
Color of Law: Siliadin v France and the Dynamics of Enslavement in Historical Perspective” in J. Allain (ed) The 
Legal Understanding of Slavery – From the Historical to the Contemporary 152 (2012). 
18 Anderson, n 13 above, 148. 
19 C. Costello, “Migrants and Forced Labour” in A. Bogg et al The Autonomy of Labour Law (2014). 
20 Ibid. 
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agencies,21 for example, without resorting to the legally imbued terms such as slavery and 
forced labour.22 But it deflects, rather than addresses, the core issue: how can we ascertain 
where we are on that continuum, or ‘hierarchy of denial of personal autonomy’,23 from 
slavery, through forced labour, unfree labour, and on to everyday, commodified labour in 
a capitalist economy?24  
To complicate matters further, we should clarify that while slavery is a core term 
signifying ‘unfree labour’, it is not the only term. Indeed, several parallel concepts surround 
‘slavery’, and at times (but not always) are viewed as comparable, rhetorically and legally. 
These include servitude (and, at times – indentured servitude), serfdom, debt bondage or 
peonage and, primarily, forced labour. Some view them as ‘proxy categories’ for modern 
slavery.25 Others, such as the ILO, state very clearly that ‘Slavery is one form of forced 
labour’,26 whilst also acknowledging that national laws sometimes treat the two as two 
different instances and ‘tend to reflect an assumption that forced labour is the least serious 
of these offences’.27 In some countries, such as Brazil, forced labour is defined as existing 
when one reduces a person to a condition ‘analogous to that of a slave’.28 One can easily 
agree that the relationship between the two ‘is not always quite clear’.29 The British Modern 
Slavery Act (MSA) offers no assistance on the matter. Indeed, as it covers slavery and 
forced labour,30 one could imagine a situation of forced labour, which is not slavery under 
ILO definitions (for slavery is but one form of forced labour) and yet still considered 
‘modern slavery’, as it is covered by the MSA.  
Against the background of this conceptual quagmire, I would suggest that forced labour 
and slavery are concepts that have significant overlaps, but also areas of mutual 
                                                          
21 J. Fudge and K. Strauss (eds) Temporary Work, Agencies, and Unfree Labour: Insecurity in the New World of 
Work (New York: Routledge, 2014). 
22 cf K. Strauss, “Coerced, Forced and Unfree Labour: Geographies of Exploitation in Contemporary Labour 
Markets” (2012) 6 Geography Compass 137, 139  in which she suggests that “unfree labour is, therefore, a broad 
category of which forced labour and slavery are subsets”. 
23 R v SK [2011] EWCA Crim 1691 [39]. 
24 K. Strauss ‘Unfree Labour and the Regulation of Temporary Work Agencies in the UK’ in Fudge and Strauss, 
n 21 above, 164, 174.  
25 Davidson, n 11 above, 8.  
26
  ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-Up to the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (2005) 8. 
27 Ibid, 20. 
28 Ibid, 21.  
29 N. Lassen, ‘Slavery and Slavery Like Practices: United Nations Standards and Conventions’ (1988) 57 Nordic 
Journal of International Law 197, 205. 
30 Section 1(2) of the Modern Slavery Act. 
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independence. For if slavery is closely associated with ownership, forced labour is defined 
with direct reference to the world of work, as ‘all work or service which is exacted from 
any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered 
himself voluntary’.31  Thus, in April 2016 the first British man was convicted for forcing 
his wife into domestic servitude.32 While she was forced to cook, clean and feed the family, 
the core of the modern slavery conviction was based on the fact that this was a forced 
marriage, characterised by ‘physical and mental torture’, including severe beatings, abuse 
and threats. In other words, the domestic work itself was a relatively minor element, and 
the slavery charges would arguably have stood regardless of their existence.  
And yet, instances abound where slavery and forced labour overlap, and those spheres 
form the main focus for this article, which asks: how are we to distinguish modern slavery 
from various forms of labour that, while objectionable to many, have become part and 
parcel of contemporary employment relations? This question has academic, policy and legal 
implications, as recent studies indicated that ‘national researchers, as well as their 
respondents, had great difficulty understanding the concept [of forced labour] and in 
distinguishing it from extremely exploitative, but nonetheless ‘freely chosen’, work’.33 
Additional practices such as trafficking and debt bondage, commonly associated with 
modern slavery, will be discussed only insofar as they are pertinent to the task at hand. 
A central premise in what follows is that the weight of history may be helpful in this 
regard. Slavery, servitude and forced labour are social and legal institutions whose social 
and intellectual meaning has over the course of centuries. When twenty-first century 
academics, activists, politicians and courts address contemporary legal, social and economic 
ills by reference to these concepts, they do so by bridging the historical institutions into 
what they see as their modern variations. In some cases, the bridge is short, clear and 
straightforward, as the historical and contemporary have much in common. In other cases, 
however, the juxtaposition of the two requires more explanation and justification. But this 
is not to say that the said juxtaposition is forced. Quite the contrary – at times, the true 
                                                          
31 ILO, Forced Labour Convention, 1930, Article 2(1).  
32 P. Walker, ‘Briton who made wife live like slave is first to be jailed for domestic servitude’ The Guardian (1 
April 2016)  
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/apr/01/man-made-wife-live-like-slave-domestic-servitude-faces-jail  
33 ILO, Global Alliance, n 26 above, 42. 
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understanding of modern slavery and forced labour can only be truly understood against 
the background of history.  
 In particular, the term ‘badges of slavery’, derived from American constitutional 
discussions concerning the 13th Amendment suggests that particular elements associated 
with the core concept of slavery are still visible today, and in a manner that demands our 
attention. During the congressional debates, Senator Trumbull argued that ‘any statute that 
is not equal to all, and which deprives any citizen of civil rights, which are secured to other 
citizens, is … in fact a badge of servitude’.34 And yet, identifying such an element or practice 
does not necessarily imply that we have before us a manifestation of (modern) slavery. In 
other words, the logical move connecting  
(1) A practice P was centrally relevant to the institution of slavery, and 
(2) Slavery was a terrible institution, that must be eradicated 
to 
(3) Therefore, P must be eradicated 
is not absurd or unreasonable, but is also not completely necessary. The logic may be 
suggested as an analytical formulation of the term ‘badges of slavery’. It could well be that 
such a badge is an indication that this practice changes an employment relationship, for 
example, to something that is far more odious. In other situations, however, it may only be 
a warning sign, suggesting that this trait should be recognised and its ramifications taken 
carefully into account. This paper, therefore, assesses the main legal themes associated with 
the institution of slavery, and that may be identified in contemporary practices.  
Through reference to the historical antecedent, the analysis identifies and analyses 
seven central ‘badges of slavery’. It does not suggest that each badge is necessary nor 
sufficient for the assertion that slavery exists. Rather, it highlights the fact that modern 
slavery is a constitution of parts that, put together, may pass a critical threshold. In putting 
forward this argument, the paper outlines these seven badges, within two clusters. While 
highlighting their relevance to the employment relationship, Section 2 analyses legal and 
                                                          
34 L. Kares ‘The Unlucky Thirteenth: A Constitutional Amendment in Search of a Doctrine” (1985) 80 Cornell 
Law Review 372, 376 note 19. The term “badge of slavery” was used by in the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Bradley in U.S. Supreme Court case Blyew v United States 80 US (18 Wall) 581, 599 (1871).  
7 
 
moral principles of general application: humiliation, ownership of the individual, 
exploitation of vulnerability, and denial of free choice. Section 3 then turns to legal 
doctrines that were central to the constitution of slavery and forced labour in the past, and 
are uniquely applicable in the employment relationship. These are:  sub-standard terms and 
conditions of employment, and restrictions on the power to end the relationship. 
2. Badges of Slavery of General Application 
A. Dignity/Humiliation  
The legal principle of dignity has acquired a prominent status in contemporary 
jurisprudence. Revered by many legal scholars as no less than the foundation of human 
rights,35 dignity is a force to be reckoned with. In some respects, one may understand the 
importance of dignity as a contrast to the humiliating treatment that individuals were 
subject to, during the Holocaust and, prior to that, under slavery. And yet, as this section 
shows, dignity and the protection against humiliation have limited value as indicators of 
modern slavery. However, its historic prominence and its contemporary reign in human 
rights theory merit some discussion.  
For Orlando Patterson, the most important aspect of slavery is the complete 
exclusion of the slave from the social order, and his or her routine subjection and 
humiliation. This exclusion must be absolute and permanent, denying the slave any 
opportunity to ‘acquire’ dignity.36 The mirror image of the slave’s condition in this respect 
is the master’s absolute power to humiliate the slave, as his own dignity correlated to his 
ability to do so. Patterson notes that this principle underlies the American custom of 
addressing adult slaves as ‘boy’. Similar expressions were common in other languages.37 
Following Hobbes, Hegel and Marx, Patterson explains that the humiliation instigated by 
the master, and lack of dignity on the part of the slave, are not only important in their own 
right, but also because of their association with power. The negation of a slave’s legal and 
social standing enables the negation of his dignity as a person. As Hegel shows, the lack of 
dignity, in turn, enables the diminished legal and social standing, preserves it as such, and 
                                                          
35  R.  Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs (Harvard University Press, 2011) 332-339; J. Tasioulas “Human Dignity 
and the Foundations of Human Rights” in C. McCrudden (ed) Understanding Human Dignity (Oxford: OUP, 
2013)  
36 O. Patterson, Slavery and Social Death (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982) 79, 86. 
37
 Ibid, 88 
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makes the slave completely dependent on the master.38 In this respect, the exploitation of 
the slave’s labour was a means to an end, rather than the main purpose. In fact, slaves were, 
at times, a financial burden on their masters.39  
The role of dignity, sometimes referred to interchangeably as honour,40 had 
concrete consequences. Blacks were not allowed to testify in court, because giving truthful 
statements was a sign of honour, and since blacks were viewed as inherently dishonourable, 
they will surely lie.41 Support for this position may be found in Robert Cover’s analysis of 
a Massachusetts case from 1781, during which a white man was convicted of assaulting and 
imprisoning his slave. In his defence, he argued that he may do with his slave as he pleases. 
The court refused to accept the claim, and fined him 40 shillings. Cover concludes that by 
viewing the slave as a person worthy of protection, the court dealt a ‘mortal wound to 
slavery in Massachusetts’.42 Underlying this conclusion we find the link between the power 
to humiliate a person, treating him as an object devoid of humanity, and the sustainability 
of the institution as a whole.  
We find, therefore, that the denial of dignity, manifested publicly as ‘social death’ and 
facilitated by extreme and constant humiliation, was an inherent feature of the early 
institution of slavery.43 To what extent is this a useful badge of modern slavery? Some 
countries, such as Brazil and Belgium, view slavery as, centrally, a violation of human 
dignity.44 The UK has taken a different course and the concept of dignity (or, for that 
matter, of humiliation) does not appear in the Modern Slavery Act, or in the accompanying 
Explanatory Notes. What can explain this omission? The important case of Siliadin may 
offer some guidance. There, the French Criminal Code made it an offence ‘to subject an 
individual to working or conditions that are incompatible with human dignity’, as part of 
the effort to combat modern slavery.45 But when the Versailles Court of Appeal found that 
                                                          
38 G.W.F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind (J.B. Baillie – trans, New York: Dover, 2003) 108 
39 Patterson, n 36 above, 100. 
40 See eg R. Goodin, ‘The Political Theories of Choice and Dignity’, (1981) 18 American Philosophical Quarterly 
91, 97-99.  
41 W.W. Fisher III “Ideology and Imagery in the Law of Slavery” in P. Finkelman (ed) Slavery and the Law 
(Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997) 43, 62. 
42 R. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984) 45.  
43 Patterson, n 36 above, 5. 
44 K. Skrivankova, Between Decent Work and Forced Labour: Examining the Continuum of Exploitation (London: 
Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 2010) 10, 12. 
45 Article 225-14 of the French Criminal Code. See Siliadin v. France [2006] E.H.R.R. 16 [48] 
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‘carrying out household tasks and looking after children throughout the day could not by 
themselves constitute working conditions incompatible with human dignity, this being the 
lot of many mothers’,46 the applicant turned to the ECtHR, claiming that reliance on 
human dignity has turned the offence into one that is ‘particularly vague, and … subject to 
random interpretation’.47 The Court accepted the claim, and found that the existing articles 
in the French Criminal Code do not deal specifically with the rights guaranteed under 
Article 4, and that an offence which is grounded in the concept of dignity is far too 
restrictive.48 Instead, the Court noted that states should make positive efforts to protect 
children and vulnerable people, in the form of effective deterrence, against serious breaches 
of their personal integrity. In conclusion, it seems that while dignity is a theoretical 
favourite, and even has an indirect impact on the understanding of modern slavery, courts 
and parliaments prefer more direct, concrete applications of legal principles when 
addressing modern slavery. One may surmise that the ECtHR’s reserved approach to an 
offence that has the violation of dignity as its axis may have led the British legislature to 
prefer other legal principles, such as exploitation, which we discuss below (section 2.C). 
B. Ownership of People 
The core concept of slavery, and the contemporary revulsion from it, is strongly associated 
with the idea that one individual can own another. Article 1(1) of the 1926 Slavery 
Convention stated that ‘slavery is the status or condition of a person over whom any or all 
of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’. The Explanatory Notes 
to the Modern Slavery Bill tread the similar path when describing the phenomenon: 
‘Modern slavery is a brutal form of organised crime in which people are treated as commodities 
and exploited for criminal gain’.49 And yet, in the first case under the Act, six Lithuanian 
migrants who worked on egg producing farms reported being debt bonded, physically 
abused, had their pay withheld, intimidated and threatened, and sheltered in inhumane 
conditions. They were not ‘bought and sold’, strictu sensu; and their exploitation was driven, 
it would seem, by profit and not ‘for criminal gain’. So is this modern slavery?  
                                                          
46 Ibid, [45] 
47 Ibid, [101] 
48 Ibid, [142] 
49 Modern Slavery Bill [HL Bill 51], Explanatory Notes, [4] [emphasis added]. 
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The approach taken by the Explanatory Notes reflects the legalistic approach to 
slavery. And yet, as we see below, the aspect of ownership is not necessary nor sufficient 
to identify slavery, and is even less related to forced labour, a practice addressed by the 
MSA. Professional football players are often ‘sold’, sometimes against their will, and yet 
are not usually seen as slaves.50 In contrast, millions of people who are kept in what may 
be termed ‘slavery conditions’ may, formally, not be owned by anyone. Can, and should, 
ownership still be used as a badge of modern slavery? 
Employment scholars seek to distinguish positive employment relations from 
odious exploitation by reference to the ILO’s 1944 Declaration of Philadelphia: ‘labour is 
not a commodity’. As one central textbook of labour economics explains: ‘Labor services 
can only be rented; workers themselves cannot be bought or sold’.51 But apart from the 
noble rhetoric, or the legal semantics, are the two truly distinct?52 Some scholars argue that 
the rhetoric is essentially empty of content, masking the reality of slavery that is taking 
place today.53 It has been suggested that this subject/object dichotomy is part of a more 
general, selective vision of binary thinking, which separates ‘past’ from ‘present’, ‘status’ 
from ‘contract’ and, crucially, ‘slavery’ from ‘free waged labour’.54 Others go further, 
suggesting that ownership has now been obscured and disguised, embedded into the logic 
of contractarian market individualism, thus intentionally making it even more difficult to 
tackle.55  
Moving beyond criticism to constructive approaches, one may accept the lack of de 
jure possession, and still focus on the powers attached to the right of ownership, as 
indicative of de facto possession, which ‘reflects the lived experience of contemporary 
slaves’.56 But, as with slavery in general, the identification of de facto ownership is not 
obvious. The difficulty stems from the fact that a central facet that is to distinguish 
                                                          
50 S. L. Engerman, ‘Slavery, Serfdom and Other Forms of Coerced Labor: Similarities and Differences’ in M.L. 
Bush (ed) Slavery and Serfdom: Studies in Legal Bondage (Cambridge: Pearson, 1996) 18, 19; H. Temperley 
‘New World Slavery, Old World Slavery’ in Bush, ibid, 144 , 146. But see some exceptions in note 16. 
51 R. Ehrenberg and R. Smith, Modern Labor Economics: Theory and Public Policy (12th ed., London: Routledge, 
2015) 2. 
52 Cf B. Langille, 'Labour Law’s Theory of Justice', in G. Davidov and B. Langille (eds) The Idea of Labour Law 
101, 114 (2011)  
53 Patterson, n 36 above, 9. 
54 Davidson, n 11 above, 14. 
55 R. Steinfeld, The Invention of Free Labor  (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1991) 90. 
56 J. Allain, Slavery in International Law: Of Human Exploitation and Trafficking (Leiden: Neijhoff, 2013) ix. 
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ownership from a normative employment relationship is ‘control tantamount to 
possession’.57 This approach was embraced by the ICTY in Kunarac, emphasising that 
enslavement will encompass not only ‘chattel slavery’, but also ‘the exercise of powers 
attaching to the right of ownership’.58 The the interpretation of slavery in international 
criminal law may not be immediately applicable to other bodies of law. And yet, it is worth 
noting the emphasis placed on control by the court: ‘control of someone’s movement, 
control of physical environment, psychological control, … , control of sexuality and forced 
labour’.59 The problem that arises with the central role that ‘control’ plays in the 
construction of slavery is that it also has a fundamental role in the construction of the 
employment relationship. Control over the work itself (how, where and to what degree it 
should be done) is, unsurprisingly, not sufficient to identify the relationship as one of 
slavery. In contrast, control over other aspects of an individual’s life should not, prima facie, 
fall under the employer’s remit and when it exists – it should be a cause for concern.  
So we find that while the core idea of ownership is still a constitutive element of 
slavery, courts are incrementally expanding the reach of ownership to cover more 
peripheral aspects, and thus to include them within ‘slavery’. The motivation for this 
change in jurisprudence is clear, but perhaps it would be analytically preferable to assess 
these factors under a separate heading, such as terms and conditions of employment 
(section 3.A) or restriction of freedom outside the employment relationship (section 3.C), 
instead of artificially extending the idea of ownership.   
But while control is less helpful in this context, a direct derivative of an ownership 
right is the power to buy, sell or transfer the object.60 This power is justly noted in Guideline 
4 of the Bellagio-Harvard Guidelines on the Legal Parameters of Slavery, and should be addressed 
in detail.61  
The master’s power to sell his right in a slave, a servant or an apprentice was an 
important implication of their property rights. And, indeed, slaves could be transferred to 
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repay a debt,62 used as security for a loan or gambled over.63 Slaves could also be 
temporarily rented out to third parties, since their services were their master’s, and not their 
own.64 Interestingly, in the fourteenth century a man was accused of retaining servants only 
in order to hire them out to others.65 The analogy to contemporary agency work 
corporations, which shift millions of workers from one employer to another, sometimes 
across national borders, subject to quotas and for a percentage of their pay, suggests that, 
in some ways, the regulation of labour was stricter 700 years ago than it is today.66 
In this context, one recurring contemporary example that is mentioned in 
discussion of modern slavery is the case of professional athletes who sometimes earn 
unimaginable sums and enjoy iconic status, and yet are referred to as being ‘bought’ and 
‘sold’, sometimes to pay for the club owner’s debt.67 To some, the comparison to 
contemporary victims of slavery in India, Nepal, Mauritania, Thailand or Burma/Myanmar, 
is ludicrous, or even infuriating. The fact that the American Internal Revenue Service (and 
the HMRC) allow clubs to deduct the ‘loss of value’, a form of ‘human depreciation’ of 
players throughout their career, is treated as anecdotal.68 And yet, perhaps the control of 
club owners over their players’ career and where they will be employed, should be treated 
more seriously. 
In 1970, the American Supreme Court ruled in the case of an elite baseball player, 
Curt Flood, who discovered that his team and transferred him without his knowledge, and 
naturally – without his consent. He wrote the Baseball Commissioner: ‘I do not feel like a 
piece of property to be bought and sold irrespective of my wishes’. His case reached the 
courts, targeting the ‘reserve clause’ which was routinely included in players’ contracts, and 
which stated that a player’s rights are owned by the club even after the contract has ended, 
and therefore he cannot negotiate employment with another team without his employer’s 
consent. He was unsuccessful, and the Supreme Court denied the appeal, on the grounds 
that judicial regulation of business should be kept to a minimum.69 Similarly, in Britain, 
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when George Eastman challenged the ‘transfer and retain’ system that allowed a club to 
refuse to put a player on the transfer list following the end of his contract, Wilberforce J 
was sympathetic to the plaintiff’s counsel view, which ‘stigmatised [it] as a relic from the 
Middle Ages, involving the buying and selling of human beings as chattels; and, indeed, to 
anyone not hardened to acceptance of the practice it would seem incongruous to the spirit 
of a national sport’.70 Despite this, Wilberforce J protected the transfer system as upholding 
a legitimate interest. So English football (and sport in general) had to wait for another 
footballer - Jean-Marc Bosman – to challenge the rules that gave power to an employer, 
even following the termination of the contract. And yet, it is noted that the European Court 
of Justice accepted Bosman’s claim based on European principles safeguarding freedom of 
movement, rather than on the right to work at any employment, without restrictions.71  
The example of professional athletes is interesting in its own right, especially 
because of the discrepancy between fame and fortune, on the one hand, and the association 
with slavery, on the other hand. But the case of workers being ‘sold’ without their consent 
is not limited to those cases.  
One such case is the matter of transfer of undertaking, which involves the transfer 
of ownership of a business or of (part of) its functions. The question arises: can employees 
(or, rather less controversially, their contracts of employment) be ‘sold’ along with the 
company’s assets, without their consent? The decision of the House of Lords in Nokes v 
Doncaster is authority for the proposition that, under the common law, the answer to that 
question is no. According to Lord Atkin, the individual’s right to choose for himself whom 
he would serve constitutes ‘the main difference between a servant and a serf’.72  
In a more recent case, Gabrielle v Peninsula Service, it was accepted that Nokes is still 
good authority in common law.73 In a similar context, the ECJ ruled that ‘the employee 
cannot be obliged to work for an employer that he has not freely chosen’,74 and an 
employee’s objection to the transfer terminates the contract of employment. It should be 
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noted, however, that the EAT in Gabrielle applied the common law because the transfer 
had not taken place under the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) 
(TUPE) Regulations.75 Under TUPE, the relevant rules are reversed: a transfer no longer 
terminates the contract of employment (unlike the situation under the common law), but 
rather any such contract is seen as if originally made between the person and the transferee, 
regardless of the transferee’s consent.76  
Other countries take a more expansive view. In Germany, for example, an 
employee’s right to remain employed by the original employer is seen as deriving from 
constitutional ‘right of personality’.77 And in Israel, the Supreme Court accepted the 
German jurisprudence on the matter and added that ‘it is obvious that workers are not 
‘property’ of the employer’,78 and that ‘the employer cannot ‘transfer’ his employees to 
another … as if they were an inanimate object or an animal… a person may transfer from 
one employer to another only upon his consent’.79 
 
C. Exploitation of the Vulnerable: Otherness, Race and Sex 
Since the protection of dignity and the avoidance of humiliation proved to be less 
helpful, the British legislature followed the ECtHR in preferring the related (though surely 
not identical) concept of ‘exploitation’,80 defined in section 3 of the MSA as including 
sexual offences, removal of organs, securing services by fraud or deception, or securing 
services from children and vulnerable people. Though, to some, exploitation may suggest 
identifying unfree labour as an essential part of modern capitalism,81 this (unsurprisingly) 
is not the approach of the MSA. In particular, the Act directs courts to take into account 
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‘all the circumstances of the case, including the circumstances that make the victim more 
vulnerable than others … This reflects the position in case law’.82  
Reviewing the definition of exploitation, we note that four of the five examples of 
exploitation refer to acts (e.g. sexual offences, removal of organs) which, while extremely 
troubling in their own right, are arguably somewhat remote from the everyday 
understanding of exploitation. The last category, in contrast, refers to the situation in which 
a person uses or attempts to use a person (V) to provide services or to receive benefits, 
and that V was chosen because he or she is a child, has a disability or is family relation, and 
is thus unlikely to refuse to be used for that purpose. It is this category that seems most 
relevant for situations which hover on the boundaries between employment relations and 
slavery.  
Thus, in Kozminski, two individuals with significant cognitive disabilities worked on 
the defendants’ farm 16 hours a day, seven days a week. They were not supplied with 
adequate food, were forbidden to leave the farm, to meet friends and relatives and were 
routinely beaten. In the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice O’Connor stated that ‘it is possible 
that threatening an incompetent with institutionalization or an immigrant with deportation 
could constitute the threat of legal coercion that induces involuntary servitude’.83 In similar 
vein, the European Court of Human Rights in Siliadin concluded that the victim, who was 
brought from Togo to France at the age of 15, was subject to forced labour and to 
involuntary servitude by exploiting her young age and her vulnerable immigration status, 
thus effectively coercing her to work. It stated that servitude, a concept closely related, and 
yet wider, than slavery, is defined (somewhat confusingly) as ‘an obligation to provide one’s 
service that is imposed by the use of coercion, and is to be linked with the concept of 
‘slavery’’.84 
What of other categories that may render a person vulnerable, and thus subject to 
exploitation? I refer, in the main, to race and sex. Neither appear in the MSA, but while 
implicit attention is given to sex when addressing human trafficking, the role of race is not 
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acknowledged in any meaningful way. This is peculiar, since slavery was never colour 
blind.85 In fact, the ‘association of the slave with the foreigner and the non-citizen draws 
on a long tradition’.86 Although Roman and Jewish laws recognised the right of individuals 
to keep their fellow men and women as slaves, their status was always distinct from that of 
slaves of a different ethnic or racial background.87 Patterson argues that the racial aspect, 
and not the idea of ownership or even the denial of civil and political rights, lies at the heart 
of slavery.88 The control of the ‘other’, to the point of eliminating his or her humanity, can 
be traced to the origins of the institution, which linked the slave to the captive enemy of 
war, and was thus seen as a constant threat, an enemy from within.89  
Moving to modern history, the role of race within slavery is obvious. In America, 
‘only blacks could be slaves and servants’.90 The deep seated racism that engulfed American 
slavery was made manifest in the infamous case of Dred Scott, in which the Chief Justice of 
the United States Supreme Court stated that black people were ‘so far inferior, that they 
had no rights that the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and 
lawfully be reduced to slavery for his own benefit’.91  
The significance of race was not limited to the master-slave relationship, but 
pervaded employment relationships as well. A New York state law from 1788 declared that 
the enforcement of an employment contract must be a rare exception, apart from cases 
involving people ‘coming from beyond the sea’.92 Based on the presumption that whites 
could never be indentured servants, since 1830 they could not be subject to long term 
contracts from which they could not unilaterally withdraw.93  
But is race relevant to modern slavery? For one of the prominent scholars of the 
phenomenon, Kevin Bales, the answer is no.94 He accepts that race, religion and ethnicity 
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were important in the past, and that remnants of their significance may still be detectable 
today, but the common thread that governs slavery in Asia and Africa, he argues, is the 
juxtaposition of significant economic power with abject poverty. He writes: ‘If all left-
handed people in the world become destitute tomorrow, there would soon be slaveholders 
taking advantage of them. Modern slaveholders are predators keenly aware of weakness; 
they are rapidly adapting an ancient practice to the new global economy’.95 Some support 
for Bales’s position may be found in the fact that one recent conviction for forced labour 
did not involve migrants, but rather the exploitation of domestic homeless people.96 
And yet, race cannot be discarded as an explanation for the persistence of forced 
labour and slavery. In Asia, low caste status is ‘unambiguously associated with a higher 
incidence of bondage’.97 In Eastern Europe, forced labour is part of an ‘ethnic business’ 
structure.98 In addition, the vulnerability of migrant workers, in developed and developing 
nations alike, is undoubtedly associated with their categorisation as ‘others’: unwanted, 
illegitimate and always temporary. In late October 2014, as the Modern Slavery Bill was 
passing through Parliament, the British Defence Minister has said that many towns in 
Britain feel ‘under siege’ from EU migrant workers, and that some communities risked 
‘being swamped’.99 Such a pronouncement by a Defence Minister intimates a strong 
connection between national defence and identity. Similarly, an advisor to the Israeli Work 
and Welfare Minister stated that migrant workers are ‘a foreign element that resides within 
me and hinders my development. It is an infection’.100 Against this background, it is notable 
that while human trafficking is treated explicitly and extensively in the Modern Slavery Act, 
migrant workers are not identified as potentially vulnerable qua their status as migrant 
workers.101 Moreover, a parallel is found in Asia in general, and in India, in particular where, 
Lerche notes, ‘the vast majority of bonded labourers continue to belong to the lowest, ex-
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untouchable, caste groups and tribes’.102 And yet, his approach dovetails Bales’s, as he notes 
that this oppression ‘has become part and parcel of Indian capitalism’.103 Indeed, instead 
of arguing for an artificial hierarchy between racism and poverty as leading to slavery and 
forced labour, it is more fruitful to acknowledge the strong linkages between the two,104 as 
one leads to the other, and where the two meet, the conditions for slavery and forced 
labour are created. 
In addition to race, sex provides an additional aspect of otherness.105 The conflation 
of the two has led to the clear denunciation of sexual relations between black and white 
individuals.106 At times, this revulsion was not only ancillary to slavery but also mobilised 
it. Thus, in 1717 the American state of Maryland legislated that if an interracial sexual 
relationship were to take place, the black party to the relationship would become a slave.107  
But it is more than that. Even independent of race, women are increasingly targeted 
as victims of modern slavery,108 and suffer disproportionately to men when they are victims 
of bonded labour, as they are susceptible to physical and sexual abuse.109 Girls and women 
are at a higher risk of occupying one of the most troubling ‘sectors’ in this context – that 
of domestic slavery.110 As the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly noted in its 
Recommendation on Domestic Slavery: ‘today’s slaves are predominantly female and 
usually work in private households, starting out as migrant domestic workers’111.  Women 
who are victims of human trafficking are often coerced into domestic servitude or into the 
sex industry. This coercion is often effected where initial consent for the travel and work 
may be ascertained, leading us to the next badge of modern slavery. 
D. Lack of Consent, or Free Choice 
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Some view lack of free will not only as a necessary condition for slavery, but as the defining 
factor distinguishing slavery from paid labour.112 Consent to enter is regarded as crucial to 
legitimate employment relations,113 and thus ‘voluntary slavery’ is an oxymoron. The 
involuntariness of entering into work is one of two main elements constituting forced 
labour, the other being work ‘extracted … under the menace of a penalty’. 
But when should we find that a person is coerced to work? A particular statute that 
sanctions the enslaving of individuals may be purged. But economic and background legal 
relations that lead an individual to ‘choose’ a life of work that is very far from his or her 
desires are far more difficult to critique. In 1958, C.S. Lewis wrote an essay entitled ‘Willing 
Slaves of the Welfare State’, in which he raged against the loss of liberty brought by the 
industrial revolution: ‘In the ancient world individuals have sold themselves as slaves in 
order to eat … so in society’. Almost 50 years later, journalist Madeline Bunting borrowed 
the title for her book documenting the overwork culture, job intensification and 
management techniques that pervade British work life.114 And yet, do ‘hi-tech slaves’ or 
‘slave doctors’ have much in common with past or current victims of slavery, in its core 
sense, apart from long hours of work, which members of both cohorts would rather avoid? 
With reference to the matter within this section, what are the parameters of choice and 
coercion that should be assessed? 
First, when ascertaining that slavery has taken place, we need to ask what must be 
the role of the state (as opposed to the market) in coercing the individual. Is indirect, or 
passive, action sufficient?115 Second, what evidence is relevant to attribute consent, or lack 
thereof, to the victim? Finally, should we be focusing solely on coercion to enter the 
employment relationship, or would coercion to continue the employment relationship, i.e. 
denying the ability to end it, be sufficient? This latter question will be addressed below, in 
section 3.B.  
The paradigm form of slavery manifests itself when the state, through its 
institutions, defines the category of people who are slaves, and decides what rights are 
denied, whether one may exit that status, and if so – how. However, the state may force 
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individuals to work, through explicit but indirect measures. Prohibition on vagrancy or 
begging in England and the United States did not only increase the prison population, but 
also forced many to accept any work, for fear of imprisonment. And today, as the Rantsev 
case revealed, some states are quite aware that sexual slavery and forced labour take place 
on their territory, but choose to turn a blind eye.116 Should workfare schemes that condition 
benefits on some form of ‘community work’ be considered sufficiently coercive for the 
purposes of this analysis?117 The former Director of the Anti-Slavery Society viewed the 
distinction between the state and individuals as the operating party as decisive in 
determining whether the practice should be categorised as forced labour or slavery. He 
stated that ‘Forced labour is exaction of involuntary labour by a government, whereas 
slavery is exaction of involuntary labour by an individual, springing from that individual's 
right of property in the person compelled to work’.118 Apart from providing further 
evidence for the conceptual confusion between the two terms, no support was found for 
this particular approach.  
So can the state be implicated for making migrants more vulnerable by strictly 
limiting their freedom to choose employers while at the same time deregulating labour 
markets and downsizing labour inspection services?119 The furthest attribution of state 
involvement in the creation of forced labour and thus – modern slavery, would identify 
government policies as facilitating the exploitation of migrant workers, the poor, and 
others. An ILO report documents numerous instances that link the absence of financial 
services to the prevalence of debt bondage, perhaps the most common proxy to slavery 
and forced labour today.120 In other words, if the state were to take a proactive role, 
facilitating the creating of credit services, or even creating them itself, it would reduce the 
prevalence of debt bondage dramatically. Indeed, this has been the result when donors and 
NGOs have taken on this task.121 Similarly, it has been argued that the Indian ‘low route’ 
of development relies on extremely cheap labour which, in turn, is brought about by 
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regional governments colluding with large employers to exploit the desperate poverty of 
the population.122 Notwithstanding the evidence, this argument, as one would imagine, 
would have the least chances of implicating an actor (here - the state) in bringing about 
modern slavery. Indeed, the ILO takes the position that the ‘employer or state is not 
accountable for all constraints or indirect coercion existing in practice’.123 
As we saw above, with regards to Kozminski and Siliadin,124 where the actions of a 
concrete individual are identified as creating conditions of slavery, courts are more willing 
to address them as such. In contrast, courts are far less inclined to identify background 
conditions (immigration laws, welfare policy, the criminal justice system) as ‘driving’ 
individuals to enter conditions of servitude, forced labour or slavery. The causal link would 
be far too fragile, and the factors to consider too varied, and thus risks eliding a useful 
distinction between paid work and slavery.125 And yet, critical scholars argue that it is this 
inability to identify a concrete actor that makes these coercive elements so powerful, as 
‘power over individuals is increasingly mediated through power over goods until the point 
is reached where the basic power relationship is largely, though never completely, 
obscured’.126 A compromise approach may suggest that these background conditions are, 
and should be, assessed under the heading of vulnerability, and susceptibility to 
exploitation, noted above.  
As for the relevant circumstances that should be taken into account when assessing 
the existence of consent, it is noted (by analogy) that the human trafficking clause in the 
MSA follows case law by clarifying that ‘it is irrelevant whether V consents to travel’.127 In 
fact, prior to the MSA, in Khan,128 the Court of Appeal minimised the relevance of consent 
even further: there, victims of trafficking were subject to threats, coercion, bullying, 
control, restriction of liberty, excessive working hours, and denial of medical treatment and 
suffered the theft of significant sums of money.  And yet, when their work visa expired, 
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they travelled to Pakistan to renew their permits, and chose to return. Increasing the 
traffickers sentence from 3 to 4 years in prison, the Court explained that this was neither 
evidence of consent nor that their treatment was acceptable. Rather, it was ‘evidence of 
further exploitation by the offenders of personal circumstances [the economic 
circumstances of the families they left behind] of which they know they could take 
advantage’.129 While this is an interesting, and laudable, position, it adds further complexity 
to the relevance of background economic circumstance to the identification of ‘true’ free 
will, which is assumed in mainstream labour relations.  
Humiliation, ownership, exploitation and denial of free choice are concepts of 
general application that shed light on modern practices through their historical antecedents. 
The next section moves to focus on aspects of the contemporary employment relationship 
that, with the benefit of hindsight, may be recognised in troubling, and non-trivial 
instances, as ‘badges of slavery’.  
3. Slavery and the Contemporary Employment Relationship 
Several concrete legal themes link slavery to practices common within the contemporary 
employment relationship. These are terms and conditions of employment; the power to 
end the employment relationship; and the employer’s power to control the worker’s life 
outside the employment relationship. 
A. Terms and Conditions of Employment 
There is a strong link between harsh terms and conditions of employment, and the 
view that coercion lies at the heart of the institution of slavery. Extreme conditions which 
shatter an individual’s dignity may be evidence that the individual has not taken up such 
work of her own free will. The Supreme Court of India, for example, viewed even excessive 
deductions, which result in workers being paid less than the minimum wage, as a form of 
forced labour.130 While this ruling was not widely embraced,131 and reportedly no longer 
followed even in India,132 exploitative terms and conditions operate as an important 
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indicator for modern slavery in general, and under the Modern Slavery Act in particular.133 
Further support for this approach is found in cases where courts refused to accept a claim 
that ‘forced labour’ was involved, where the terms of employment (as distinguished from 
the coercion) were not unpleasant. Somewhat embarrassingly for members of a particular 
profession, two such cases involved European lawyers who claimed that forcing them to 
represent disadvantaged groups as part of a legal aid initiative constitutes ‘forced labour’.134 
A similar argument was brought by two American high school students who objected to 
their school’s mandatory community volunteering programme.135 The courts refused to 
entertain these arguments, stating that aside from the encroachment on free will, a claim 
for ‘forced labour’ or ‘slavery’ must show that the work is unjust and oppressive and that 
its performance must constitute ‘an avoidable hardship’, be ‘needlessly distressing’ or at 
least ‘somewhat harassing’.136 The fact that this badge was not present, in other words, was 
crucially detrimental to the their case. 
Contrast these cases with three others. In Siliadin,137 the victim cared for three 
children seven days a week, without a day off; slept on the floor in the children’s bedroom; 
was subject to frequent insults and harassment; and was never paid. The Court integrated 
these findings into its analysis, leading it to the conclusion that the victim was held in 
servitude.138 In Kozminski, Justice Brennan stressed that ‘oppressive working and living 
conditions, and lack of pay or personal freedom are the hallmarks of that slavelike 
condition of servitude’.139 In CN v UK,140 the applicant, a young woman who escaped a life 
of sexual and physical violence in Uganda, arrived in the UK to work as a live-in carer for 
an elderly couple. As the male employer was severely debilitated by Parkinson’s disease, 
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she was permanently on-call day and night, changed his clothes, fed him and cleaned him. 
She was given a couple of hours leave one Sunday a month and was warned not to speak 
to anyone. 
As Siliadin and CN suggest, domestic work is of particular interest for those seeking 
to identify the border between work and slavery. Historically, domestic slavery was, at 
times, the most common form of slavery. The intimate association with the master or 
mistress of the house had, and still has, important consequences, well beyond the economic 
relationship.141 Today, domestic work seems to be a necessary evil, especially within the 
care sector. Longer life expectancy has expanded the golden age of the elderly. Progressive 
changes to the perception of aging have led to a preference of life at home and in the 
community, over dedicated homes for the elderly.142 Enhanced globalisation has expanded 
the opportunities to employ women from developing nations in Africa and Asia to Western 
countries, for the purpose of caring for children, elderly and individuals with disabilities. 
Potentially, these developments could be a monumental drive for women’s mobilisation, 
while simultaneously improving the welfare of individuals in need, in OECD countries.143  
But contemporary domestic work has proved problematic in practice, and has raised 
suggestions of parallels with slavery.144 The gendered nature of employment, the unique 
structure of the intimate relationship, including residence in the employer’s home, the 
round-the-clock treatment, have led the ILO to view domestic work as meriting special 
attention over 50 years ago.145 In the early 2000s, the ILO published two reports on forced 
labour, with special attention to domestic work as a central locus of forced labour.146 The 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Modern Slavery Bill noted that ‘The experiences of 
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overseas domestic workers who are ill-treated by their employers are ‘often at the 
exploitative end of employment or at the cusp of domestic servitude’’.147 The European 
Parliament’s Recommendation on Domestic Slavery (2001) noted that an estimated 4 
million women are sold worldwide for domestic work, and that the ‘physical and emotional 
isolation in which the victims find themselves, coupled with fear of the outside world, 
causes psychological problems which persist after their release and leave them completely 
disoriented’.148 Recently, the ECtHR stated that  
domestic servitude is a specific offence, distinct from trafficking and 
exploitation, which involves a complex set of dynamics, involving both overt 
and more subtle forms of coercion, to force compliance.149 
And yet, it is the very uniqueness of this relationship, hovering between ‘the market’ 
and the non-market (family labour), which has led to the legal exclusion of domestic 
workers from the realm of certain employment rights.150 In the UK, domestic workers are 
denied certain working time and health and safety protections,151 minimum wage rights152 
and particular equality provisions. The Israeli Supreme Court rejected a claim for overtime 
benefits brought by domestic workers, asserting that their unique relationship is not 
covered by existing legislation.153 This exclusion of workers from legal rights by the 
legislature and the courts is an important, and relatively exceptional, example of the state’s 
direct contribution to a ‘badge of slavery’.  
In addition, and to reiterate the point of vulnerability noted above, mention should 
be made of two recent cases of domestic work that are not instances of slavery or servitude 
(or at least, were not claimed as such) – Taiwo and Onu.154 In both cases, Nigerian women 
came to the UK on a migrant domestic worker visa, and were treated badly by their 
employers. The Court of Appeal accepted the EAT’s holdings, according to which 
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immigration status did not constitute grounds for a discrimination claim. One may 
determine that if background conditions, such as migration status, cannot support a 
discrimination claim, it is even less likely that they may be used to support a more serious 
charge of servitude or slavery. And yet, as we see in the next section, there are strong 
reasons to challenge that position.  
B. Limits on the Power to End the Employment Relationship 
After Indiana became a state in 1816, its new constitution declared that ‘There should be 
neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the state’. Only five years later, in the case of 
Mary Clark,155 the court had the opportunity to decide a central issue, which bridges the 
predicament of slaves and that of servants and workers: would a contract entered 
voluntarily be transformed into involuntary servitude if the worker was coerced to remain 
in the employment relationship? And if so, what would constitute such coercion? In the 
case of Mary Clark, the Indiana Supreme Court was clear: an order of specific performance 
of an employment contract ‘would produce a state of servitude as degrading and 
demoralizing in its consequences, as a state of absolute slavery’.156 Almost 300 years later, 
the ILO clarified that victims may be in a situation of forced labour even when they enter 
the situation freely, but ‘discover later that they are not free to withdraw their labour’.157  
But how are we to establish if a person is not free to withdraw her labour? In its 
seminal 2005 report, the ILO seems to limit such conclusions to situations in which a 
victim’s initial consent to enter the employment relationship was obtained through fraud 
and deception, or if they are unable to leave their work owing to legal, physical or 
psychological coercion.158 And yet, some reference to economic coercion is found in the ILO 
Indicators for ‘menace of penalty’, which include debt bondage and withholding of 
wages.159 A more recent ILO Report notes that ‘coercion’ that bars the worker from ending 
the relationship will include requiring deposits, withholding documentation, threats or use 
of violence, imposing financial penalties or requiring payment of recruitment fees.160 It may 
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be noted that some practices on this list are quite common in current day employment 
contracts. 
For several centuries, slaves, serfs and servants who left their masters in England 
and the United States were subject to criminal charges, and to imprisonment. Indeed, this 
principle is still enshrined in the U.S. Constitution. Article 4(2), paragraph 3 (the Fugitive 
Slave Clause) states that ‘No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws 
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be 
discharged from such service or labour’. And so, a Pennsylvania statute that made it illegal 
to return a slave to his master was struck down as unconstitutional.161 It is noted that, 
despite its title, and the fact that it was used to target slaves, the Clause’s formulation is far 
more general, and theoretically applicable to workers as well.  
In England, the Ordinance of Labourers and the Statute of Labourers of 1351 prescribed 
imprisonment for a worker or apprentice ‘retained in service’ if they withdrew unilaterally 
from a contract, and was routinely enforced,162 making the labour contract ‘public, long 
term and unbreakable’.163 Even after abolition, a servant who left his master prior to the 
end of the contractual term was subject to imprisonment as one who stole from his 
employer.164 It is estimated that during the latter part of the nineteenth century, over 10,000 
workers were prosecuted for this offence.165 A keen awareness to the fine line that should 
separate labour and servitude, and the importance of the ability to end the relationship in 
preserving this line, articulated by a British Court in 1890: 
I should be very unwilling to extend decisions the effect of which is to compel 
persons who are not desirous of maintaining continuous personal relations with 
one another to continue those personal relations. I think the courts are bound 
to be jealous lest they should turn contracts of service into contracts of 
slavery.166  
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Coercion backed by imprisonment was incrementally replaced in some American 
states with a felony charge and a maximum fine. Only in the early 20th century did the US 
Supreme Court find that the peonage laws of Alabama were akin to indentured servitude, 
and thus unconstitutional.167 During WWII, an imaginative sanction was put in place for 
workers who left their employer before the end of their contract – conscription.168  
Against this background, monetary incentives seem almost tame. American labour 
law in the nineteenth century routinely viewed the contract as a ‘whole’. The implication 
of this principle was that a worker hired for a prescribed period, and who left prior to the 
end of the period, was not entitled to any pay for the period.169 ‘Direct coercion would not 
be permitted’, writes Steinfeld, ‘but legally sanctioned economic compulsion would’.170 For 
over a century courts sided with employers in such cases, suggesting that an alternative 
would lead to a ‘monstrous absurdity, that a man may voluntarily and without cause violate 
his agreement’.171 It was only in 1944 that the United States Supreme Court confirmed a 
worker’s constitutional right to end her employment before the contract expired.172 
Referring to the 13th Amendment, the Court linked the terms and conditions of 
employment, referred to above, with this constitutional right: ‘When the master can compel 
and the laborer cannot escape the obligation to go on, there is no power below to redress 
and no incentive above to relieve a harsh overlordship or unwholesome conditions of 
work’.173 
And yet, the reach of the 13th Amendment was not without limits. In 1897, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that the amendment was never intended to apply to seamen’s 
contracts, and thus was not in conflict with a statutory provision that allowed federal 
marshals to detain deserting seamen and deliver them to the master of the vessel.174 The 
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court explained that the contract of the sailor has always been treated ‘as an exceptional 
one’ akin to that of a soldier, and perhaps some others.175 
Would those ‘others’ include, for example, those in the medical profession? While 
most would view the possibility of imprisoning workers for leaving their employers mid-
contract as blatantly anachronistic, a peculiar development in Israel, in the summer of 2011, 
proved that not to be the case. The story began when 1000 medical trainees (in their final 
year, prior to becoming licensed doctors) expressed their frustration following a new 
collective agreement, signed by a doctors’ union with the Israeli government and the 
National Health Service, which they viewed as ignoring the interests of their sector. When 
they could not convince their union to renegotiate the agreement, they submitted uniform 
letters of resignation. Following the government’s request, the National Labour Tribunal 
(NLT) issued an injunction, demanding that they return to work, stating that the act was 
an illegal strike, since unauthorised abandonment of their post would lead to ‘serious 
consequences’.176  
The drama ended with the employers and the unions agreeing to reopen 
negotiations, to the satisfaction of the trainees. But the question remains: what are the 
‘serious consequences’ that could have resulted had all parties stood fast? The refusal to 
come to work is an obvious repudiatory breach of contract, exposing the worker to 
summary dismissal. In this case, however, it would have been an empty sanction. Since 
they had resigned on their own initiative, dismissing them would not have achieved a thing. 
Thus one can only assume that the implicit threat underlying the court’s warning was none 
other than an injunction for contempt of court, for failing to obey the original instruction 
to return to work. Such an injunction carries with it the threat of a fine, or imprisonment, until 
the individual capitulates. Would it have come to that?  
If some would view the proposition that medical doctors are serfs as preposterous, 
bonded labour, particularly in Asia, and the situation of migrant workers raise very serious 
concerns. The two, of course, are not mutually exclusive. Migrant workers may be more 
effectively exploited, particularly through ‘loans’ compelling them to stay in the 
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employment relationship, and through the manipulation of ‘repayment’ of the loan.177 Here 
again, the historical analogy is instructive.  
In 1834, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled in the case of one Mr Fisher, who 
sought to set his slaves free.178 The court ruled that the manumission of the slave must be 
conditioned upon sending them to Liberia. By explaining that ‘free negroes are a very 
dangerous and objectionable population’, the court provided an excellent example of 
positing the slave as the paradigmatic other, or stranger, and also of the antecedent to the 
contemporary threat that looms over migrant workers’ contracts: leaving their employer 
would result in losing their immigration status.  
The current overseas domestic worker (ODW) visa regime in Britain, in place since 
2012, generally does not allow domestic workers to change employers, leading 
Mantouvalou to characterise it as a ‘visa of enslavement’.179 The Joint Committee on the 
Draft Modern Slavery Bill expressed its concern, stating that ‘[t]ying domestic workers to 
their employer institutionalizes their abuse; it is slavery’.180 And yet, the Act was passed 
with no reform to this element of migration policy. Most recently, an independent review, 
commissioned by the British government, concluded that ‘it is widely, near unanimously, 
held view that where immigration laws tie a migrant domestic worker’s status to a specific 
employer, the vulnerability of that worker to abuse, including slavery and human 
trafficking, increases’.181 Such evidence led to the tempering of the ODW visa in September 
2015. Section 53 of the MSA now provides that (only) victims of slavery and human 
trafficking may change employers and retain the right to remain in the UK for at least a 
further six months. 
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The ODW visa is but an extreme case of the overall policy, which Bridget Anderson 
aptly captures as a heavily regulated immigration regime coupled by a de-regulated 
employment sphere. In an effort to ‘control our borders’, countries have put in place a 
restrictive immigration regime that limits the freedom that migrant workers have vis-a-vis 
their employers. These include, in the main, revoking an individual’s leave to stay in the 
country once she leaves an employer. The analogy to ‘freeing’ serfs on condition that they 
return to their country of origin can hardly be clearer and, indeed, these restrictions suggest 
that migrant labour under these conditions is ‘unfree’, if not necessarily ‘forced’.182 
Ironically, far from protecting the local workforce (e.g. ‘British Jobs for British Workers’), 
this policy ‘creates a set of employment relations that mean that migrant workers are 
preferable to British’.183 The peril of deportation under this scheme makes them more 
‘reliable’, more vulnerable and subject to exploitation by employers. The Israel Supreme 
Court thus minced no words in declaring its illegality: 
It is impossible not to reach a painful and embarrassing conclusion that the 
migrant worker has become his employer’s serf … that the bondage 
arrangement has created a version of modern quasi-slavery. In imposing the 
bondage arrangement, the state pierced the migrant workers’ ear to the door 
of their employers, chained their hands and legs to the employer who 
‘imported’ them. The migrant worker has become … a thing among things … 
and has made them like the slaves of yesteryear, like those humans who built 
the pyramids or rowed the boats of war for the Roman Empire.184   
It is worth noting that the Israeli arrangement struck down by the Court is not 
dissimilar to the British overseas domestic worker visa, discussed above. Indeed, the 2014 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Modern Slavery criticised recent changes to immigration 
rules that included the removal of the non-EU workers’ right to change employers.185 It 
stated: ‘tying migrant workers to the employers institutionalises their abuse. It is slavery 
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and is therefore incongruous with our aim to act decisively to protect victims of modern 
slavery’.186  
C. Rights and Status outside the Work Environment 
Although slavery was common throughout the ancient world, the Roman Empire’s model 
of slavery is one of the most notable, insofar as modern practices are concerned. The 
master’s complete control over the slave’s life and, in particular, the power to change one’s 
status from a free person to a slave, are important characteristics of Roman slavery. Slaves 
and servants were denied independent legal standing, and thus could not appear in court, 
own property, start a family or enjoy legal protection from violence, including sexual and 
fatal acts of violence perpetrated by the master.187 The shift from status to contract was 
thus an indicator of ‘progressive societies’188 because, inter alia, of the legal system’s 
willingness to protect an individual’s rights regardless of class or status.189 The contract 
would reflect the paradigm of freedom.  
However, insofar as the employment relationship is concerned, matters become 
more complicated. The contract, in this case, could also serve as a mechanism to entrench 
status and social subordination. Referring to Weber’s notion of ‘status contracts’, Steinfeld 
explains that the master’s control over the slave, and in many ways – the employer’s control 
over the worker, are more akin to governance than to a commercial relationship. For this 
reason, a slave’s murder of his master was considered not only homicide, but treason.190  
Viewing complete control as a necessary element of the master-slave relationship 
may explain why problematic features of modern employment relations still fall short of 
slavery. The power to ‘sell’ a football player and limiting a doctor’s right to resign may find 
their antecedents in practices that were common under slavery, but do not lead to the 
conclusion that they constitute the same institution. The football player and the doctor can 
go home at the end of a work day, raise a family and buy a house. The master’s control 
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may be significant, and yet is limited to the relevant areas of the employment relationship. 
As such, it is different from the power of the master over his slaves.191 
However, the case of migrant workers, again, suggests a modern analogy that may 
exist. One of the most severe restrictions on the lives of slaves concerned their ability to 
raise a family. In part, this was achieved through an effort to physically separate men and 
women.192 Since this measure could not guarantee success in limiting procreation, the law 
was employed to deny slaves legal family rights.193 Parents had no rights over their children 
(including a right to custody), and children were denied the right to inherit from their 
parents.194 
To what extent do contemporary immigration policies follow the historical lead? 
Policies that deprive a female migrant worker of her right to work if she becomes pregnant 
arguably constitute an extreme form of control over a worker’s intimate choices. In 2011, 
a ‘Grand Chamber’ of 15 judges of the Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the policy is illegal, 
as it violates the rights of migrant workers in a manner that is disproportionate and 
unreasonable.195 The court was not persuaded by the government’s argument that the 
worker’s right to raise a family was unaffected by the policy, since she could always 
terminate her employment, leave the country, and raise a family in her native country. Two 
judges found it appropriate to quote the Swiss playwright and novelist Max Frisch, who 
quipped: ‘we asked for workers. We got people instead’.196 
4. Conclusion 
Constraints of space barred us from discussing numerous cases, not all of which 
reached the courts, which manifest the badges of slavery highlighted here. So one Israeli 
case may be representative.197 A woman was smuggled to Israel illegally, ‘bought’ by one 
trafficker, ‘rented out’ to another trafficker, forced to give sexual services seven days a 
week, to 10-12 customers a day, was locked up in an apartment for six months, and her 
                                                          
191 Patterson, n 36 above, 27. 
192 Temperley, n 50 above, 167; Patterson, n 36 above, 6. 
193 Engerman, n 50 above, 24. 
194 Patterson, n 36 above, 189. 
195 HCJ 11437/05 Workers’ Hotline v the Home Office (2011). For a discussion of further cases, which also 
manifest the badges noted here, see e.g. Skrivankova, n 44 above, 22-28. 
196 Ibid, Justice Jubran [9], Justice Levi, [32]. 
197 Labour Appeals 247/07 Anon v Sofia Cochick (24.09.2009). 
34 
 
passport was taken from her. Even this extremely brief overview reveals ownership, sexual 
and national ‘otherness’, intolerable conditions and control of life outside work. The 
National Labour Tribunal noted that ‘this disgusting phenomenon’ of human trafficking is 
essentially ‘modern slavery’ and has become commonplace.198 The NLT stated that ‘the 
criminals-traffickers gain profit from their employment through abuse and treachery, 
depriving them of humanity and offending their dignity and their basic rights in the gravest 
way’.199 The NLT also refused to view the victim of trafficking as ‘consenting’ to 
prostitution, despite the fact that initial consent was proven.200  
The advancement of the Modern Slavery Act is a good opportunity to reflect on 
the most precarious aspects of contemporary labour markets and to ask whether their 
association with labels such as slavery or forced labour is justified. This was done here by 
disassembling the concepts by reference to their historical, cultural, social and legal aspects, 
assessing the importance that each attribute held in the original institution, and its 
importance in contemporary labour relations.  
Identifying the constituent parts of modern slavery may provide an analytical guide, 
or map, to the analysis of future cases that may come before the courts under the MSA. 
The latter three badges – terms and conditions of employment; power to end the 
relationship; and control of rights outside work – are strongly linked to the first four 
badges, logically, philosophically and politically, and may be seen as deriving from them. 
Together, the badges may explain why professional athletes and medical professionals are 
not slaves and, truth be told, neither are workfare participants, objectionable as the practice 
may be. As the Australian High Court noted, in upholding the first slavery conviction since 
the introduction of anti-slavery laws in Australia in 1999: ‘It is important not to debase the 
currency of language, or to banalise crimes against humanity, by giving slavery a meaning 
that extends beyond the limits set by the text, context, and purpose of the 1926 Slavery 
Convention’.201  
It is difficult to disagree with the Australian Court on this matter. And yet, the 
rhetorical use of the term ‘slavery’ by academics and activists may be justified as part of the 
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ongoing effort to expand and enhance the rights of migrant workers in general, and 
domestic workers in particular; to raise awareness to employers’ increased control over the 
lives of workers outside the workday; and to provide a platform for a campaign against 
demeaning and degrading terms and conditions of employment.  
Awareness of the badges of slavery that, more often than not, are attached to their 
predicament, should galvanise courts to develop employment law instruments, such as 
broadening the ambit of protection from discrimination, as part of the effort to truly make 
those badges a thing of the past. 
 
